Re: what DOES the GPL really say?

[thomas@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Thomas Bushnell, n/BSG)]

Scott Michel <scottm@cs.ucla.edu> writes:

> Quick! We need a Randian to jump in and set things straight "Why Kant
> Is A Really Bad Thing"!

Ayn Rand was an idiot.  Kant was wrong, but not an idiot.  Plato,
Hegel, and Aristotly were also wrong, and also brilliant.  Ayn Rand
was wrong, but not brilliant, not original, and certainly an idiot.

> The problem with the above rules is that they are subjective. I doubt
> if anyone can give me a concrete def'n what universal laws of nature
> and morality are (appealling to my rational side, not my emotional
> "But it's just good and the other is evil, dammit!")

A universal law of nature is one that does, in fact, always happen.
To wish "truth telling" to be a law of nature is to wish for the
impossibility of lying.  Roughly, then, the "universal law of nature"
test of ethical principle says "act in manner X if you can
consistently wish that all rational beings always acted in manner X." 
This seems perfectly objective to me, even if difficult in practice to
apply.

The "difficulty in practice" is in fact very severe, let me hasten to
point out.  The problem is that morality applies in the first instance
to actions, not maxims, and there is no single way to figure out for
an action what the maxim was.  Kant's principle only talks about
maxims, alas, and there's no way to make it talk about actions. 

> The "Golden Rule" is well defined, even in the abstract. It causes one
> to reflect as to what the consequences of action are.

The Golden Rule is hopeless as an ethical test, if you use it
in even a slightly non-charitable fashion.  It does not offer any
escape from subjectivity at all; leaving me to figure out "what I want
others to do for me" and then do that for others.  Rand, who pretends
to say "nothing" to the former question, can thus bogusly claim to be
honoring ethical principle in doing nothing for others.  This is not
the triumph of the Golden Rule, it's the desmonstration that it does
not really work in a critical environment.

> The same can't be said of Kant, who couldn't anyway, even in smug
> superiority.

If you read the _Metaphysics_of_Morals_ you will see that, in fact,
Kant talked about results of actions all the time.  Constantly.  His
every discussion focuses on the results of actions.  I can only
suspect that you have never read the _Metaphysics_of_Morals_.  (This
is hardly unique; most people who have read widely in philosophy have
never read it.  The _Metaphysics_of_Morals_ is usually skipped in
favor of the _Grounding_of_the_Metaphysics_of_Morals_ and the
_Critique_of_Pracitical_Reason_.)  _MM_ is all about the analysis of
particular proposed maxims; the analysis applies the categorical
imperative most frequently in its "ends/means" formulation ("Treat
other people as means only if in that action you simultaneously treat
them as an end") and in so doing, Kant discusses outcomes and
consequences exceedingly frequently.

> Thomas and I have sparred on this in the past. And I doubt that there
> will ever be any resolution to the Plato/Hegel/Kant vs.
> Aristotle/Aquinas/Rand dichotomy, so long as the P/H/K types claim
> that the A/A/R are unfeeling, overly rational, and just plain evil,
> dammit!

Plato and Hegel were much less rational that Kant or Aristotle.  They
themselves gloried in this, with much about intuition and mystic
rapture and what not as so very important.  Aristotle pooh poohed all
that (somewhat dismissively, alas--it would be nice to see a more
reasoned critique than he gives us) and insisted on a much more
down-to-earth nuts and bones philosophy.

Kant is really an odd bug in this mix.  He's no friend of Hegel, and
fits much better in an Aristotelian mix.  Applying the corrective of
the critique, Kant notices that reason isn't so good as Aristotle (or
Descartes) thought.  But Kant doesn't propose to replace reason with
feeling or vague intuitions (a la Hegel), but rather to just remain
silent.  He has the greatest respect for reason, in fact--and where
reason cannot tread, Kant basically thinks humans cannot go--so there
is no rival to reason for its preeminence (again, contra Hegel).

The real clue here is that you are to busy thinking that Ayn Rand is
not an idiot to actually read Kant.  This I know, for you lump Kant in
with thinking that ethics has anything to do with feeling!  The one
thing that Kant is most honored for in ethics is not the categorical
imperative, and certainly not the casuistic analysis of MM, but rather
the striking claim that ethics comes entirely (100%, with absolutely
nothing left over) from reason--with absolutely no admixture of
passion, inclination, or feeling of any kind.  

Aristotle and Aquinas actually are my favorites to read, with Kant as
a close third.  Ayn Rand, however, (which, sad to say, I have read) is
just an idiot.

Thomas