Re: library/binding for sftp?

["Randy Brukardt" <randy@rrsoftware.com>]

<Stefan.Lucks@uni-weimar.de> wrote in message 
news:alpine.DEB.2.10.1308191900320.24091@debian...
On Fri, 9 Aug 2013, Randy Brukardt wrote:

>>>>>> Firstly, there is no protection against targeted attack. Secondly,
>>>>>> regarding spies, they aren't any good in programming. Obscuring is
>>>>>> the best method against unfocused surveillance which works only
>>>>>> with known protocols.
>>>>>
>>>>> Four false statements in a row.
>>>>
>>>> There are only three here,
>>>
>>> Three sentences, but I see two statements in the third sentence.
>>
>> There is only one in the third sentence that I see. "best method". The 
>> rest
>> is a definition.
>
>Randy, I see two statements in the third sentence, and no definition:
>
>1. obscuring is the best method against unfocused surveillance
>2. unfocused surveillance works only with known protocols.
>
>I question the first statement.

Right.

>The second one is dangerously wrong, and there are plenty of
>counterexamples.

I view it as a definition. You're forgetting that packet inspection and the 
like (the basis of "unfocused surveillance") depend completely on "known 
protocols", since TCP/IP and the various routing protocols are surely "known 
protocols". It's impossible to send anything over the Internet (public or 
local) without using many known protocols.

If you truly are using only "unknown protocols", then you're by definition 
using a private wired connection, and clearly only a determined attacker 
would have access to that. And there is no defense against such attackers; 
the most you can do is annoy them enough that hopefully they'll look for an 
easier target.

>One common error frequently found in homegrown protocols is encrypting
>some stuff while leaving other sensitive information in the clear. E.g.,
>older versions of WinZip did support the encryption of files, while
>including plain filenames in the archives. (I am not sure about recent
>versions of WinZip.) Any protocol based on sending "encrypted" archives
>would trivially leave the filenames open even for unfocused surveillance
>operations -- if that was fishing for filenames.

This is where I always lose it. Filenames being sensitive information? Only 
if the programmers in question are complete idiots. (And I realize there are 
plenty of them out there.) I can't imagine any value being associated with 
knowing that there is a file name "J2Typ_De.Ads" that makes up part of the 
Janus/Ada compiler. Sure, perhaps a dedicated attacker might find out some 
program that you're using in that way, but there are thousands of ways for 
such attackers to get in. Plugging one has no effect whatsoever.

Besides, anyone who puts anything sensitive in the cloud for long-term 
storage is going to be a victim sooner or later. ("Sensitive" here meaning 
with long-lived value, like credit card numbers.) Sooner or later, any of 
these things will be broken (and that's assuming that the NSA doesn't 
already require backdoors, which seems likely).

It's now known that the NSA tracks pretty much every internet connection. 
Sending anything over the Internet is guarenteed to leave a trace, so if 
that is "sensitive information" to you, simply don't do it. And if you have 
*truly* sensitive information, don't put it on the Internet (ever!), and try 
not to put it on a computer, either.

I've been talking about information that you'd rather not have people see 
(which for me, is almost anything I do) but doesn't need NSA-grade 
protection. I don't care if the NSA sees that I'm corresponding with you 
here, but if I wanted to keep them (and everyone else) from simple content 
scans, I'd use a custom protocol. (I think it's likely that they can read 
SSH transactions, but I don't think they can do that in real-time.)

If you need public connections, then surely use SSH. But you can surely do 
better.

In truth, though, it's probably all pointless. The government (anybodies 
government) will soon ban computers that they can't control. It seems likely 
that Windows 8 in particular is full of backdoors (indeed, it seems to have 
a frontdoor in terms of the "Microsoft account" which clearly allows 
Microsoft and thus the NSA to track logons and location for almost every new 
Windows computer). I would expect that will be done by essentially 
preventing anyone that has an unapproved computer from connecting in any way 
to the Internet. And then the enslavement of the masses will be complete. 
("1984" was far too kind as to our future.)

                                                Randy.