Re: A Last Word on Ciphertext Expansion Ratio - Promise.

[mrvmurray@gmail.com]

On Saturday, 6 December 2014 15:46:00 UTC, Austin Obyrne  wrote:
> I have never felt there was anything for me to defend really in such a large
> ciphertext expansion given the relative cheapness of computer memory and
> computer power today ...

Whatever. If you won't listen, nobody will listen to you. A 10x increase in size is
BAD. Folks get uppity over a 10% increase!

> * At the time of designing my algorithm I envisaged  two main attacks on
> my cipher that I must counter i.e. ...

No attacker is going to conveniently stick to the only attacks you have
demonstrated you understand. They usually use the ones you demonstrate
an inability to counter, and if you don't even understand the attack, the
attacker has beaten you solidly.

> The upshot of all of this is that there was some considerable 'overkill' in
> the eventual ciphertext of my first cipher which I have now put right.

Nope. The attack which you are ignoring still stands. Brute force. That fact
that you don't understand how it could possibly work is my win.

> A few more submarine cables and a few more communications satellites
> would do the trick if the data transmission super highway ever gets too
> crowded.  Having worked on submarine cable repairs in the North Atlantic
> for a few years I know the cost of implementing this claim and albeit
> expensive to lay cables on the oceanbed 2 miles down it is not enough
> to break the bank by any means I can assure you.

Bullshit. Nobody is going to put in 10 undersea cables where one will do.
They won't even put 2 if 1 will do.

> Once again I thank the group for their all-round help in this matter.

The help you continue to reject, you mean?

Show your gratitude by taking the advice seriously, not dismissing it.

M
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