Re: Ariane5 FAQ

["Robert I. Eachus" <rieachus@attbi.com>]

Hyman Rosen wrote:

> You seem to know more about the Ariane 5 project than what
> is found in the accident report. It would be kind if you can
> provide links that would give us more information, aside from
> the accident report which we already have.

How about another accident report, on the upper stage this time which 
reveals that the same process problems existed throughout the Ariane 5 
program: http://www.arianespace.com/site/news/releases/presrel01_8_07.html

As you can see, the base problem is the same as in the 501 failure. 
Inadequate testing of the upper stage propulsion system under Ariane 5 
conditions.

But the reasons that I got involved in a close scrutiny of the Ariane 
501 failure was that Arianespace was in the same position on that 
project as MITRE is on many DoD and other government projects.  MITRE 
acts as the system engineer for the government while contractors build 
individual portions of the system.  At the time of the Ariane 501 
disaster I was in that role with respect to GEODSS and CMU.

A group from MITRE did a review of the project to see if we would have 
caught the problem.  And as I said the glaring hole in Arianespace's 
process on Ariane 5 was this issue of distributing the overall project 
requirements but having no process for insuring that all the original 
requirements were met.

This is managing of several interlocking contracts is something that 
MITRE often goes through.  Using the old nomenclature the A spec 
requirements would be distributed by the individual contractors to the 
B5, and they would want MITRE to certify that meeting the B5 
requirements would satisfy the A-spec requirements.  We would always 
refuse, and instead certify that they were contracted to meet the B5 
requirements.  Many contractors never understood the difference, but as 
you can see from the Ariane 5, there is a difference and it is major.

For example on the SCIS contract I was actually the one to "pull the 
trigger" and tell US Space Command after a particular performance 
review, that they as the using customer had to bite the bullet and 
accept that the system currently under contract would be of no use to 
them.  I won't go into gory details, but the Goldwater-Nichols 
reorganization meant that the system under contract no longer met their 
(A level) requirements.  Obviously this was in no way the fault of the 
contractor--or for that matter the government.  But we needed 
renegotiate the contract to reflect the changed requirements.

The changes caused by Goldwater-Nichols were not deployed in time for 
the first Gulf War, but workarounds were used with Scud launch data. 
The changes were there for the recent fighting in Afganistan and Iraq, 
and were an improvement over the Gulf War situation.  So 
Goldwater-Nichols was a significant improvement in the way large scale 
joint combat was run, and some of those changes had cost consequences. 
Fine, as long as you go in with your eyes open--and continue to compare 
the overall system to the overall system requirements not just the 
detailed requirements.

-- 

                                                Robert I. Eachus

�In an ally, considerations of house, clan, planet, race are 
insignificant beside two prime questions, which are: 1. Can he shoot? 2. 
Will he aim at your enemy?� -- from the Laiden novels by Sharon Lee and 
Steve Miller.