Re: GAO report on DoD mission-critical spending

[shanks@saifr00.cfsat.honeywell.com (Mark Shanks)]

Mr. Aharonian provides an abstract of a GAO report on DoD mission critical
software systems, edits below:

>...the Pentagon's mission-critical systems continue to be plagued by
> a host of long-standing software development problems, including cost,
> schedule and performance shortfalls.
> Many studies both by the GAO and DoD have pointed out a variety of 
> deficiencies, ranging from a lack of management attention to ill-defined
> system requirements to inadequate testing.  
> Why has this situation persisted so long?  GAO notes that the understanding
> of software as a product and of software development as a process is not
> keeping pace with the growing complexity of existing and emerging mission-
> critical systems. The Pentagon is trying to overcome this dilemma through 
> two main programs - the software action plan working group and the 
> Corporate Information Management initiative. Whether these efforts will
> solve the military's formidable software problems is uncertain;
> there are no easy answers.

Given Mr. Aharonian's propensity for blistering attacks on "mandated"
Ada, the DoD, and each of the services, I am unsure of the spin placed
on this abstract or his motivation in posting it. However, having spent
10 years in the Air Force and 9 years at McDonnell in St. Louis, I
feel qualified to offer my opinions on the subject.

Having the Pentagon involved in solving software development process
problems is about as helpful as having Leatherface help you trim your
fingernails. Particularly specious is the line about "the understanding
of software as a product and of software development as a process is not
keeping pace with the growing complexity of existing and emerging mission-
critical systems"; I might change that to read, "the Pentagon's
misconception that requirements can be changed, added or deleted with
no concern towards schedule impact or software quality is exceeded only
by their belief that funding can be cut or even dropped, sometimes for
years at a time, without affecting the program's existence or the
contractor's ability to stay in the business." In an environment
where the existence of a given program is at the whim of not only
Congress in general but assorted political hacks, both civilian AND
military, it is hardly surprising that there are amazing cost and
schedule overruns and/or performance shortfalls. These problems, though,
will not be responsive to "working groups" and "initiatives"; I have
seen PLENTY of these, and their primary aim is to perpetuate themselves.
In time, some even issue forth volumes of platitudinous bull-hockey,
which are either (soundly) ignored or (unfortunately more frequently)
are used to flog the (innocent) engineers until the next round is issued
(typically being at 180 degree odds with the previous blather). 

The military's software problems, I can sincerely assure you, are no
more "formidable" than those in civilian industry, except for those
induced by external forces, primarily the Pentagon itself. The contractors
are quite willing to adopt new processes and technologies (you wouldn't
BELIEVE how many Demmings/Juran classes McDonnell held in the early 80s),
but the slap-happy world of the Pentagon-management-trend-of-the-month
club has not demonstrated itself to be a stable source of practical
guidance.

Have a nice day :>

Mark Shanks
Principal Engineer, 777 Displays
shanks@saifr0.cfsat.honeywell.com
Disclaimer: These remarks do not reflect the opinion of Honeywell, and
I might even disavow them myself.