From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on polar.synack.me X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.4 X-Google-Thread: 103376,bde6706c124e6eed X-Google-Attributes: gid103376,public X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit Path: g2news1.google.com!news3.google.com!border1.nntp.dca.giganews.com!nntp.giganews.com!wns14feed!worldnet.att.net!209.244.4.230!newsfeed1.dallas1.level3.net!news.level3.com!news.binc.net!kilgallen From: Kilgallen@SpamCop.net (Larry Kilgallen) Newsgroups: comp.lang.ada Subject: Re: Filenames in Ada Date: 17 Dec 2005 17:18:50 -0600 Organization: LJK Software Message-ID: References: <1653090.31FM62oI6I@linux1.krischik.com> <1255659.7PSTQaQJvX@linux1.krischik.com> <1839239.KAMAmvIqvL@linux1.krischik.com> <992vp1pv50m3oqoliarp0s5lbi23n9otih@4ax.com> <1993143.vyPih64Mhk@linux1.krischik.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: eisner.encompasserve.org X-Trace: grandcanyon.binc.net 1134861425 26219 192.135.80.34 (17 Dec 2005 23:17:05 GMT) X-Complaints-To: abuse@binc.net NNTP-Posting-Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2005 23:17:05 +0000 (UTC) Xref: g2news1.google.com comp.lang.ada:6910 Date: 2005-12-17T17:18:50-06:00 List-Id: In article , Simon Wright writes: > Martin Krischik writes: > >> I permanently have a root console open on my system and when I use a >> Linux system where I don't have the root password I feel like a >> cripple. >> >> I don't feel that way on VMS - there is a SET PRIVILEGE command >> there. > > I don't see the difference between SET PRIV and sudo, really (of > course SET PRIV has all that feature set re: AUTHPRIV etc!) I do not know what "sudo" is, but VMS people who have seen Unix systems say that a considerable difference is that VMS users can be restricted in the set of privileges to which they have access. The apparent set of 43 privileges or so should not be taken at face value, but instead one should (gasp) actually read the documentation and see how those 43 are divided into 7 "categories" (actually levels) according to how much damage they could do to the system. But even within a single level, making distinctions regarding which privileges are enabled does protect against some inadvertent cockpit errors. Of course a major strength of SET PRIVILEGE, as distinguished from logging into the SYSTEM username, is that auditing is according to individual username so that actions can be tied back to a real person. I would hope the same is provided on Unix.