From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on polar.synack.me X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.4 X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit X-Google-Thread: 103376,f948976d12c7ee33 X-Google-Attributes: gid103376,public X-Google-ArrivalTime: 2003-07-02 08:03:57 PST Path: archiver1.google.com!news1.google.com!newsfeed.stanford.edu!news-spur1.maxwell.syr.edu!news.maxwell.syr.edu!newsfeed.stueberl.de!proxad.net!usenet-fr.net!enst.fr!not-for-mail From: "rleif" Newsgroups: comp.lang.ada Subject: RE: Boeing and Dreamliner Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2003 08:02:44 -0700 Organization: ENST, France Message-ID: NNTP-Posting-Host: marvin.enst.fr Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Trace: avanie.enst.fr 1057158186 43475 137.194.161.2 (2 Jul 2003 15:03:06 GMT) X-Complaints-To: usenet@enst.fr NNTP-Posting-Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2003 15:03:06 +0000 (UTC) To: "'Marin David Condic'" , Return-Path: X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 11.0.4920 X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 Thread-Index: AcNApEELVUU3sUZMS9yiWxxomW9VAwAAkBMg In-Reply-To: <3F0176A5.8050001@noplace.com> X-BeenThere: comp.lang.ada@ada.eu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.2 Precedence: list List-Id: comp.lang.ada mail to news gateway List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Xref: archiver1.google.com comp.lang.ada:39977 Date: 2003-07-02T08:02:44-07:00 The discussion of the Ariane V fiasco below can be summed up by the first law of software engineering, Garbage_In = Garbage_Out. The garbage, in this case was a design specification that included inappropriate reuse. I hope that we can either end this discussion or reorient it to something more productive. Bob Leif Robert C. Leif, Ph.D. e-mail rleif@rleif.com -----Original Message----- From: Marin David Condic [mailto:nobody@noplace.com] Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2003 4:55 AM To: comp.lang.ada@ada.eu.org That is exactly wherein lies the fault. The software itself was designed properly and it behaved exactly as it was intended to for an A-4 rocket. It detected a failure and accommodated it. Just that in the A-5 this wasn't a "failure". The true problem came in that the unit in question was never flown on a bench simulation for the new rocket. This was *extremely* poor judgement on the part of the program management - probably under pressure to cut costs. Its just practically unheard of to take a critical piece of avionics and mount it in a new application and not do some form of system test across the expected flight envelope. (Even if the "system test" is a flight test with a pilot and a parachute. ;-) This was a management screw-up, pure and simple. Had they conducted a system test, it would have shown the flaw in the system. You can't blame the IRS - it did *exactly* what it was designed to do. Attempts to do so are akin to mounting a golf-cart tire on a semi truck and then cursing it when it blows out. MDC Dennis Lee Bieber wrote: > > Surely there was a /requirements/ document for both A-4 and A-5, and > somewhere in there was something specifying the performance of the > vehicles. /That/ should have been the red-flag that something needed to > be retested. That is, if the A-4 had a spec stating some performance > feature of "x", and the A-5 equivalent shows "X+1", then shouldn't the > software responsible for handling the spec be tested to ensure it can > handle "X+1"? > -- ====================================================================== Marin David Condic I work for: http://www.belcan.com/ My project is: http://www.jast.mil/ Send Replies To: m c o n d i c @ a c m . o r g "In general the art of government consists in taking as much money as possible from one class of citizens to give to the other." -- Voltaire ======================================================================