From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on polar.synack.me X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.4 X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit X-Google-Thread: 103376,6482d0ae6dcb1b4c X-Google-Attributes: gid103376,public X-Google-ArrivalTime: 2002-09-28 22:13:05 PST Path: archiver1.google.com!news1.google.com!newsfeed.stanford.edu!newsmi-us.news.garr.it!NewsITBone-GARR!area.cu.mi.it!newsfeeder.edisontel.com!fu-berlin.de!uni-berlin.de!hse-mtl-ppp74259.qc.sympatico.CA!not-for-mail From: Christopher Browne Newsgroups: comp.lang.ada Subject: Re: if file exist Date: 29 Sep 2002 05:13:04 GMT Organization: cbbrowne Computing Inc Message-ID: References: <3d9245da.259420486@news.cis.dfn.de> <3D933A6B.5000105@cogeco.ca> <8db3d6c8.0209270247.5bf07ae5@posting.google.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: hse-mtl-ppp74259.qc.sympatico.ca (64.229.208.36) X-Trace: fu-berlin.de 1033276384 11847169 64.229.208.36 (16 [125932]) X-Draft-From: ("nntp+chvatal:comp.lang.ada" 2987) X-Home-Page: http://www.cbbrowne.com/info/ X-Emacs-Acronym: Embarrassed Manual-Writer Accused of Communist Subversion Microsoft: Where even the version numbers aren't Y2K-compliant X-Uboat-Death-Message: TORPEDOED BY TINY GNATS. EXPLODING. U-19. Xref: archiver1.google.com comp.lang.ada:29410 Date: 2002-09-29T05:13:04+00:00 List-Id: In the last exciting episode, Keith Thompson wrote:: > "Marin David Condic" writes: >> Q: Are you a spy? >> >> A: I'm not allowed to say... >> >> Maybe its better to think about it from the OS level - provide something in >> an OS interface package that says "We'll return whatever information the OS >> will give us about the file and it is OS dependent as to what the result >> is..." That way whatever security the OS wants to provide is respected. > > I don't think we are (or should be) debating whether to respect the > security provided by the OS. Violating OS security isn't just a bad > idea, it's just plain impossible (barring OS bugs, of course). FYI, here are two /highly/ relevant links to documents concerning a Multics security evaluation done back in 1974. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/history/karg74.pdf http://domino.watson.ibm.com/library/cyberdig.nsf/papers?SearchView&Query=(multics) Part of the conclusion was that Multics /wasn't/ acceptably secure, back then, and that some modifications to the security design would be required to make it /really/ secure. The OSes of today have downright moved backwards from that. Another part of the conclusion was that part of the security Multics /did/ have came from the string support in PL/1. The buffer overruns that C is famed for wouldn't happen in PL/1, and more than likely aren't Ada things either... Some interesting principles pop out, in any case... -- (concatenate 'string "cbbrowne" "@ntlug.org") http://cbbrowne.com/info/multics.html I've had a perfectly wonderful evening. But this wasn't it. -- Groucho Marx