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From: eachus@spectre.mitre.org (Robert I. Eachus)
Subject: Re: Fortran or Ada?
Date: 1998/10/02
Message-ID: <EACHUS.98Oct2160023@spectre.mitre.org>#1/1
X-Deja-AN: 397147427
References: <36068E73.F0398C54@meca.polymtl.ca>
 <slrn70dv6k.2qp.gisle@krake.ii.uib.no> <m3n27sqhms.fsf@visar.physast.uga.edu>
 <6u8r5o$aa4$1@nnrp1.dejanews.com> <m3zpbq24wq.fsf@visar.physast.uga.edu>
 <360A3446.8AD84137@lmco.com> <6udre0$ha1$1@nnrp1.dejanews.com>
 <19980925.185359.250@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <6uifdr$dog$1@nnrp1.dejanews.com>
 <19980928.184428.604@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com>
Organization: The Mitre Corp., Bedford, MA.
Newsgroups: comp.lang.fortran,comp.lang.ada
Date: 1998-10-02T00:00:00+00:00
List-Id: <comp.lang.ada>

In article <19980928.184428.604@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com writes:

   > It appears to me that this implicates Ada in at least two respects...

    If you read a little more, you will find that it doesn't implicate
Ada or any other programming language.  They followed this particular
fault tree all the way down because it occurred, not because the
rocket would have survived if it hadn't.  Note later in the report
where it says that the stack was destroyed when the engine deflection
exceeded the physical stress limits of the stack (booster and
payload).  Because the software was used WITHOUT CHANGE from the
Arianne 4, it contained the wrong physical parameters for the dynamic
deflection limits.  This launch was a disaster waiting to happen, and
no programming language is going to save you from putting in the wrong
numbers.  The particular error that occurred was just the first case
where differences between the Arianne 4 and Arianne 5 became
significant.

    One last note which bears repeating.  There were no programmers or
other non-management personnel at fault, because management ELIMINATED
all such positions.  The inertial management unit was being reused
without change on the Arianne 5, so no developers were ever hired.
Given a choice of test methods, they chose to demonstrate that the IMU
worked.  But the "full-up" simulation testing was cancelled--as a cost
saving--before the development work on the non-flight parts was
complete.  No non-manager ever had both the Ariane 5 technical specs
and the flight guidance software in hand, with or without authority to
evaluate or test one against the other.
--

					Robert I. Eachus

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