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Date: 2 Oct 92 16:29:36 GMT
From: darwin.sura.net!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!eff!world!
srctran@gatech.edu  (Gregory Aharonian)
Subject: Recent GAO reports on DoD computing
Message-ID: <BvI5tD.H43@world.std.com>
List-Id: <comp.lang.ada>

 
    The GAO monthly publishes reports about its analyses of the operations of
the rest of the government.  Many involve DOD operations, especially software
and hardware development.  What follows are abstracts to reports issued in
the past few months. Single copies of the report are available for free from:
 
			U.S. General Accounting Office
			P.O. Box 6015
			Gaithersburg, MD  20877
 
______________________________________________________________________________
 
           STATUS OF THE SURVIVABLE COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION SYSTEM
 
                   Briefing report to the House Subcommittee
                    on Defense, Committee of Appropriations
		              GAO/IMTEC-92-61BR
 
 
        This report responds to your request for information on the Department
    of the Air Force's acquisition of the Survivable Communication Integration
    System (SCIS).  Specifically, you asked for information on program cost
    and schedule overruns, and the status of design and development activities
    that affect SCIS' ability to satisfy the Department of Defense's attack
    warning and attack assessment communications requirements.  This report
    provides the details of that briefing. Appendix I contains our objectives,
    scope, and methodology, briefing charts, and explanatory narrative for
    each chart.
 
    [......................  History of SCIS   ..............................]
 
        The current system cannot send messages concurrently over both media -
    a limitation that influenced the Air Force to develop a more survivable
    system, one that can send messages over many media at the same time.  That
    system is SCIS.  It is being designed and developed to process missile
    attack warning messages and provide highly-survivable communications
    through the use of multiple communications media over which messages will
    be sent concurrently, thus increasing the likelihood that attack messages
    will be received even if one or more media become inoperable.  SCIS will
    also create summary messages, a grouping of discrete messages processed
    at regular time intervals, which provide general information such as the
    total number of missiles launched, the number of launches from each launch
    area, the number of missiles expected to hit different areas, and the
    initial predicted time of impact for each target area.
 
 
                         RESULTS IN BRIEF OF GAO REVIEW
 
        Management and development problems with the SCIS program have
    contributed to a 65-percent increase in program costs (from $142 million
    to $234 million) and a 3-year delay in completion (from 1992 to 1995).
    After working on SCIS for 4 years, the prime contractor [E-Systems] was
    unable to deliver a system that could process sensor data fast enough to
    meet Air Force specifications.  To help solve the problem, the Air Force
    is allowing the contractor to replace the computer platform, for the
    second time at government expense, with a faster, more powerful model.
 
        Further, the Air Force has reduced the number of communications media
    to be used from five to three, thus reducing its survivability - a key
    factor for its justification.  Of the three remaining media, two (CHS and
    JRSC) are already available for communicating missile warning messages;
    the third (MILSTAR) is not expected to be operational until several years
    after SCIS is delivered.
 
        According to the Air Force, CHS in all likelihood will be the first
    medium to go down during a nuclear attack.  If a nuclear confrontation
    should occur before MILSTAR becomes operational, JRSC will be the only
    medium available to transmit attack warning messages.
 
    (The report goes on to detail incomplete validation by the Air Force of
    system requirements led to cost overruns and the two hardware throughput
    upgrades, and an incomplete model of system availability by E-Systems).
-- 
**************************************************************************
Greg Aharonian
Source Translation & Optimiztion
P.O. Box 404, Belmont, MA 02178