From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on polar.synack.me X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.4 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,FORGED_MUA_MOZILLA autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.4 X-Google-Thread: a07f3367d7,af0c6ea85f3ed92d X-Google-Attributes: gida07f3367d7,public,usenet X-Google-NewGroupId: yes X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit Received: by 10.204.132.72 with SMTP id a8mr1055064bkt.5.1329593141532; Sat, 18 Feb 2012 11:25:41 -0800 (PST) Path: t13ni42722bkb.0!nntp.google.com!news1.google.com!news4.google.com!fu-berlin.de!uni-berlin.de!individual.net!not-for-mail From: Niklas Holsti Newsgroups: comp.lang.ada Subject: Re: Arbitrary Sandbox Date: Sat, 18 Feb 2012 21:24:31 +0200 Organization: Tidorum Ltd Message-ID: <9qac7gFk0nU1@mid.individual.net> References: <2aaee0a4-e820-4a75-bbaf-d9d09c366d2c@f5g2000yqm.googlegroups.com> <4da4bf75-e6c9-4c17-9072-ab6f533ed93f@vd8g2000pbc.googlegroups.com> <203d63cf-42a9-49ef-82cd-943d77b5e438@c21g2000yqi.googlegroups.com> <193cr8xol0ysi.14p4cp2yxnb0r$.dlg@40tude.net> <1jleu301thnd3$.s23priwn3ajb$.dlg@40tude.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Trace: individual.net 49pydd3jDgpLyW+GiId5+wfF1YsdJt882OLhideWPXhkNkTQwG Cancel-Lock: sha1:YU5tjfghVclfz73ATTGugTsFRSM= User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; rv:10.0.2) Gecko/20120216 Thunderbird/10.0.2 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Date: 2012-02-18T21:24:31+02:00 List-Id: On 12-02-18 20:55 , Robert A Duff wrote: > "Dmitry A. Kazakov" writes: > >> I wonder what kind of architecture could require a safe implementation of >> Ada, e.g. when private parts of packages and protected objects would be >> mapped onto the memory physically inaccessible from public contexts. ... > Why do work at run time that can be done at compile time? > Implementing things in hardware doesn't magically make > them free. > > Putting high-level support for higher-level languages in hardware > has been tried a number of times, and it's always been a bad idea. For some critical systems, having checks at more than one level is good. I seem to remember that the Burroughs mainframe computers had rather poor hardware-level protections. A buggy or malicious compiler could generate code that had harmful effects that were not restricted to the user running the code, if I remember correctly. A consequence was that an ordinary user was not allowed to create a compiler; special privileges were required to label a program as a "compiler" and thus let it generate executable code. I agree with Bob that high-level things like visibility do not benefit from hardware support. But I wish hardware could detect erroneous executions of Ada programs. -- Niklas Holsti Tidorum Ltd niklas holsti tidorum fi . @ .