From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on polar.synack.me X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.4 required=5.0 tests=AC_FROM_MANY_DOTS,BAYES_00, LOTS_OF_MONEY autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.4 X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit X-Google-Thread: 107f24,582dff0b3f065a52 X-Google-Attributes: gid107f24,public X-Google-Thread: 103376,bc1361a952ec75ca X-Google-Attributes: gid103376,public X-Google-Thread: 1014db,582dff0b3f065a52 X-Google-Attributes: gid1014db,public X-Google-Thread: 109fba,582dff0b3f065a52 X-Google-Attributes: gid109fba,public X-Google-ArrivalTime: 2001-08-22 09:25:32 PST Path: archiver1.google.com!newsfeed.google.com!newsfeed.stanford.edu!newsfeeds.belnet.be!news.belnet.be!psinet-eu-nl!psiuk-p4!uknet!psiuk-n!news.pace.co.uk!nh.pace.co.uk!not-for-mail From: "Marin David Condic" Newsgroups: comp.lang.ada,comp.lang.c,comp.lang.c++,comp.lang.functional Subject: Re: How Ada could have prevented the Red Code distributed denial of service attack. Date: Wed, 22 Aug 2001 12:13:26 -0400 Organization: Posted on a server owned by Pace Micro Technology plc Message-ID: <9m0ln6$8f6$1@nh.pace.co.uk> References: <3B6555ED.9B0B0420@sneakemail.com> <87n15lxzzv.fsf@deneb.enyo.de> <3B672322.B5EA1B66@home.com> <4a885870.0108112341.7ce02ac0@posting.google.com> <3B834E5D.B0D26AB1@adaworks.com> <9lvsic$bet9s$1@ID-9852.news.dfncis.de> <9m0193$grs$1@bird.wu-wien.ac.at> <9m08tm$bsbo3$1@ID-9852.news.dfncis.de> NNTP-Posting-Host: dhcp-200-133.miami.pace.co.uk X-Trace: nh.pace.co.uk 998496806 8678 136.170.200.133 (22 Aug 2001 16:13:26 GMT) X-Complaints-To: newsmaster@news.cam.pace.co.uk NNTP-Posting-Date: 22 Aug 2001 16:13:26 GMT X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Newsreader: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4522.1200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4522.1200 Xref: archiver1.google.com comp.lang.ada:12252 comp.lang.c:76155 comp.lang.c++:84859 comp.lang.functional:7627 Date: 2001-08-22T16:13:26+00:00 List-Id: Consider that a Naval vessel is a weapon of war whos purpose is to protect the shores of the nation. Even if it is on a testing cruise, it could at any moment be called upon to do combat. At any moment, it could be fired upon by an unfriendly power and need to defend itself. Shake down cruise or not, that vessel always needs to be prepared to face a possible attack. There's no way the captain could go to an enemy submarine "Hey guys... 'Time Out'? I've got engine control problems..." It is ultimately the responsibility of the captain of the vessel to be sure that when he puts to sea, his boat is prepared for whatever it may face. Having to have it towed back to port is evidence on the face of it that he didn't do his job right. (You're testing an engine control? Why didn't you have a known, reliable unit on-board as backup in the event this unproven one broke? Hmmmm????) People who have played the DoD game know that what we are building is serious as hell and it cannot fail or lives and the nation itself are at risk. Failure isn't an option. That's one of the reasons that Ada is important to critical defense systems. MDC -- Marin David Condic Senior Software Engineer Pace Micro Technology Americas www.pacemicro.com Enabling the digital revolution e-Mail: marin.condic@pacemicro.com Web: http://www.mcondic.com/ "Ted Dennison" wrote in message news:rCPg7.10478$2u.74412@www.newsranger.com... > > You clearly don't know much about the Navy to say this. You don't debug Navy > engine controllers by putting them on a 1$ billion Cruiser with a proud captain > and a full compliment of crew and having them steam around a bit to see what > happens. Having a failure so bad that a ship has to be towed is *the* nightmare > scenario in the naval engine controller biz. Its a public humiliation for the > captain, and you can trust that heads *will* roll over it. Even after that, the > captain is probably *never* going to trust that company's engine controllers > again. If he one day gets into the procurement side, that could be disasterous > for them. > > Any engine controller should have been completely debugged *years* before it > ever touched a ship. The fact that there were still simple bugs at this point is > a *scathing* inditment of something. We can argue over what that thing is, but > there is no argument that is was a big deal. >