From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on polar.synack.me X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.4 required=5.0 tests=AC_FROM_MANY_DOTS,BAYES_00 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.4 X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit X-Google-Thread: 107f24,582dff0b3f065a52 X-Google-Attributes: gid107f24,public X-Google-Thread: 103376,bc1361a952ec75ca X-Google-Attributes: gid103376,public X-Google-Thread: 109fba,582dff0b3f065a52 X-Google-Attributes: gid109fba,public X-Google-Thread: 1014db,582dff0b3f065a52 X-Google-Attributes: gid1014db,public X-Google-ArrivalTime: 2001-08-06 12:48:27 PST Path: archiver1.google.com!newsfeed.google.com!newsfeed.stanford.edu!newsfeeds.belnet.be!news.belnet.be!psinet-eu-nl!psiuk-p4!uknet!psiuk-n!news.pace.co.uk!nh.pace.co.uk!not-for-mail From: "Marin David Condic" Newsgroups: comp.lang.ada,comp.lang.c,comp.lang.c++,comp.lang.functional Subject: Re: How Ada could have prevented the Red Code distributed denial of service attack. Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2001 15:35:23 -0400 Organization: Posted on a server owned by Pace Micro Technology plc Message-ID: <9kmrht$kcb$1@nh.pace.co.uk> References: <9k9if8$rn3$1@elf.eng.bsdi.com> <3B687EDF.9359F3FC@mediaone.net> <5267be60.0108021911.7d8fe4@posting.google.com> <9kmbc9$e64$1@nh.pace.co.uk> <3B6ED4FF.F3A9D29F@yahoo.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: 136.170.200.133 X-Trace: nh.pace.co.uk 997126525 20875 136.170.200.133 (6 Aug 2001 19:35:25 GMT) X-Complaints-To: newsmaster@news.cam.pace.co.uk NNTP-Posting-Date: 6 Aug 2001 19:35:25 GMT X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Newsreader: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4522.1200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4522.1200 Xref: archiver1.google.com comp.lang.ada:11411 comp.lang.c:72553 comp.lang.c++:80441 comp.lang.functional:7362 Date: 2001-08-06T19:35:25+00:00 List-Id: This is implying that the software itself was reviewed to check its limitations. It was not. Reread the report. They took an IRS that was designed for and used on the Arianne 4 and used it on the Arianne 5 without testing it in the new flight envelope. It wasn't a case of downloading some utility software from the Internet and recompiling it for a new system or some similar software-reuse scenario. This was an *embedded* computer*system* that had software as one of its "parts" and nobody tested the "part" to see if it was strong enough to hold an Arianne 5. It is roughly analogous to your purchasing a VCR that has embedded computer software to drive the buttons, etc., and plugging it in to an entirely new video source. Don't trust this thread to give you an accurate picture of what went on in the disaster. There is a lot of misinformation, conjecture, theorizing, etc. that is not based on an understanding of the Inertial Reference System in question or how it was used or how hardware of this type is typically built, etc. Read the report. Read some of the commentary about the report from people who should know something about rockets, etc. It is not the situation that many people imagine it to be or try to wishfully think it into being. It is *definitely* not a case where someone was charged with reviewing some code and didn't see an appropriate comment in the module banner. Nobody reviewed, analyzed or tested *anything* prior to its first use on the Arianne 5. MDC -- Marin David Condic Senior Software Engineer Pace Micro Technology Americas www.pacemicro.com Enabling the digital revolution e-Mail: marin.condic@pacemicro.com Web: http://www.mcondic.com/ "CBFalconer" wrote in message news:3B6ED4FF.F3A9D29F@yahoo.com... > > I don't think that is correct. As I read this thread, the problem > was in the documentation of the module. That should have stated, > somewhere, "This module is specific to the Arianne 4 flight > path". Possibly, at some point it was not, but once the > specificity went in so should have the documentation annotation. > > To quote a famous actor "you gotta know your limitations". >