From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on polar.synack.me X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.4 required=5.0 tests=AC_FROM_MANY_DOTS,BAYES_00 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.4 X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit X-Google-Thread: 107f24,582dff0b3f065a52 X-Google-Attributes: gid107f24,public X-Google-Thread: 1014db,582dff0b3f065a52 X-Google-Attributes: gid1014db,public X-Google-Thread: 109fba,582dff0b3f065a52 X-Google-Attributes: gid109fba,public X-Google-Thread: 103376,bc1361a952ec75ca X-Google-Attributes: gid103376,public X-Google-ArrivalTime: 2001-08-06 07:55:54 PST Path: archiver1.google.com!newsfeed.google.com!newsfeed.stanford.edu!newsfeeds.belnet.be!news.belnet.be!psinet-eu-nl!psiuk-p4!uknet!psiuk-n!news.pace.co.uk!nh.pace.co.uk!not-for-mail From: "Marin David Condic" Newsgroups: comp.lang.ada,comp.lang.c,comp.lang.c++,comp.lang.functional Subject: Re: How Ada could have prevented the Red Code distributed denial of service attack. Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2001 10:42:23 -0400 Organization: Posted on a server owned by Pace Micro Technology plc Message-ID: <9kmacg$dqr$1@nh.pace.co.uk> References: <3B687EDF.9359F3FC@mediaone.net> <3B6A588C.B67A9CF8@isltd.insignia.com> <9ked6d$mtr$1@nh.pace.co.uk> NNTP-Posting-Host: 136.170.200.133 X-Trace: nh.pace.co.uk 997108944 14171 136.170.200.133 (6 Aug 2001 14:42:24 GMT) X-Complaints-To: newsmaster@news.cam.pace.co.uk NNTP-Posting-Date: 6 Aug 2001 14:42:24 GMT X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Newsreader: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4522.1200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4522.1200 Xref: archiver1.google.com comp.lang.ada:11370 comp.lang.c:72459 comp.lang.c++:80317 comp.lang.functional:7341 Date: 2001-08-06T14:42:24+00:00 List-Id: "Tor Rustad" wrote in message news:ypTa7.3739$e%4.109795@news3.oke.nextra.no... > > Not quite, it's with high probability a *wrong* conclusion to assume > simultanouse HW fault in duplicated/independent HW. > I don't know where you got the idea I said it was correct to assume simultaneous HW fault in duplicated/independent HW. If anything, I was stating that this was the *correct* design given that it is not very likely that the sensors on *both* channels would simultaneously go bad. (If they do, you're screwed anyway and your rocket is going in the ocean and there isn't anything I can do about it with software.) Hence, detecting that a sensor value is way out of any sane and reasonable range might be sufficient grounds to shut down the bad channel and switch to the other side. FDA is a very tricky business, so it is hard to second-guess the decisions that were taken in this regard without full knowledge of all the hardware and software issues. I'd be inclined to believe that the original designers knew what they were doing in designing that FDA. -- Marin David Condic Senior Software Engineer Pace Micro Technology Americas www.pacemicro.com Enabling the digital revolution e-Mail: marin.condic@pacemicro.com Web: http://www.mcondic.com/