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From: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Newsgroups: comp.lang.ada,comp.lang.c,comp.lang.c++,comp.lang.functional
Subject: Re: How Ada could have prevented the Red Code distributed denial of
 service attack.
Date: Thu, 27 Dec 2001 13:16:19 +0100
Organization: Enyo's not your organization
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Date: 2001-12-27T13:16:19+01:00
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Kilgallen@eisner.decus.org.nospam (Larry Kilgallen) writes:

> If those other tactics are more difficult, it means productivity
> (in the cracking business) is lower using those tactics. Otherwise
> those tactics would be in wider use today.  Perhaps they are even
> less easily spread to Script Kiddies.

For what it's worth, there are more or less script-kiddy compatible
tools for non-transparent proxying of SSH and SSL connections.