From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on polar.synack.me X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.3 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00, REPLYTO_WITHOUT_TO_CC autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.4 X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit X-Google-Thread: 103376,f039470e8f537101 X-Google-Attributes: gid103376,public X-Google-ArrivalTime: 2003-07-30 05:56:40 PST Path: archiver1.google.com!news1.google.com!newsfeed.stanford.edu!logbridge.uoregon.edu!newshub.sdsu.edu!elnk-nf2-pas!newsfeed.earthlink.net!stamper.news.pas.earthlink.net!stamper.news.atl.earthlink.net!harp.news.atl.earthlink.net!not-for-mail From: Richard Riehle Newsgroups: comp.lang.ada Subject: Re: Ariane5 FAQ Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2003 05:58:49 -0700 Organization: AdaWorks Software Engineering Message-ID: <3F27C108.14E7000A@adaworks.com> References: <1058968422.225561@master.nyc.kbcfp.com> <3F200AD0.94F79098@adaworks.com> <7u9Ua.13412$634.10307@nwrdny03.gnilink.net> <3F215120.1040706@attbi.com> <1059151910.357790@master.nyc.kbcfp.com> <3F248CEE.5050709@attbi.com> <3F25FB81.A81694FA@adaworks.com> Reply-To: richard@adaworks.com NNTP-Posting-Host: 41.b2.40.2e Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Server-Date: 30 Jul 2003 12:56:39 GMT X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.7 [en] (Win98; I) X-Accept-Language: en Xref: archiver1.google.com comp.lang.ada:41003 Date: 2003-07-30T12:56:39+00:00 List-Id: Hyman Rosen wrote: > But if the Ariane 4 code had carried the specification limits > within it, as DbC, or as SPARK assertions, or as range checks, > perhaps someone might have noticed that the Ariane 5 failed to > meet those constraints. Yet they did design the Ariane 4 within those limits. They would have had to anticipate some yet unknown information regarding future projects. There is limit to how much checking one can do in any system. Industrial Engineers raise the question of 100% checking for 0.0001 % probability of error. This becomes a risk management problem as well as a problem in engineering economics. Every software product carries a certain amount of risk. As we weight the consequences of a risk against the cost of mitigation/prevention and the probability it will occur, we make choices. In the case of Ariane 4, the risk was deemed inconsequential -- a correct deeming, it seems. For Ariane 5, the risk was significant, but the engineers failed to recognize it. Richard Riehle