From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on polar.synack.me X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.4 X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,CP1252 X-Google-Thread: 103376,f039470e8f537101 X-Google-Attributes: gid103376,public X-Google-ArrivalTime: 2003-07-25 11:44:39 PST Path: archiver1.google.com!news1.google.com!newsfeed.stanford.edu!logbridge.uoregon.edu!arclight.uoregon.edu!wn13feed!wn12feed!worldnet.att.net!204.127.198.203!attbi_feed3!attbi.com!sccrnsc02.POSTED!not-for-mail Message-ID: <3F217A92.20208@attbi.com> From: "Robert I. Eachus" User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.0.2) Gecko/20021120 Netscape/7.01 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 Newsgroups: comp.lang.ada Subject: Re: Ariane5 FAQ References: <1058813341.841940@master.nyc.kbcfp.com> <1058816605.566685@master.nyc.kbcfp.com> <1058968422.225561@master.nyc.kbcfp.com> <3F200AD0.94F79098@adaworks.com> <7u9Ua.13412$634.10307@nwrdny03.gnilink.net> <3F215120.1040706@attbi.com> <1059151910.357790@master.nyc.kbcfp.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit NNTP-Posting-Host: 66.31.71.243 X-Complaints-To: abuse@comcast.net X-Trace: sccrnsc02 1059158676 66.31.71.243 (Fri, 25 Jul 2003 18:44:36 GMT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 18:44:36 GMT Organization: Comcast Online Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 18:44:36 GMT Xref: archiver1.google.com comp.lang.ada:40816 Date: 2003-07-25T18:44:36+00:00 List-Id: Hyman Rosen wrote: > You seem to know more about the Ariane 5 project than what > is found in the accident report. It would be kind if you can > provide links that would give us more information, aside from > the accident report which we already have. How about another accident report, on the upper stage this time which reveals that the same process problems existed throughout the Ariane 5 program: http://www.arianespace.com/site/news/releases/presrel01_8_07.html As you can see, the base problem is the same as in the 501 failure. Inadequate testing of the upper stage propulsion system under Ariane 5 conditions. But the reasons that I got involved in a close scrutiny of the Ariane 501 failure was that Arianespace was in the same position on that project as MITRE is on many DoD and other government projects. MITRE acts as the system engineer for the government while contractors build individual portions of the system. At the time of the Ariane 501 disaster I was in that role with respect to GEODSS and CMU. A group from MITRE did a review of the project to see if we would have caught the problem. And as I said the glaring hole in Arianespace's process on Ariane 5 was this issue of distributing the overall project requirements but having no process for insuring that all the original requirements were met. This is managing of several interlocking contracts is something that MITRE often goes through. Using the old nomenclature the A spec requirements would be distributed by the individual contractors to the B5, and they would want MITRE to certify that meeting the B5 requirements would satisfy the A-spec requirements. We would always refuse, and instead certify that they were contracted to meet the B5 requirements. Many contractors never understood the difference, but as you can see from the Ariane 5, there is a difference and it is major. For example on the SCIS contract I was actually the one to "pull the trigger" and tell US Space Command after a particular performance review, that they as the using customer had to bite the bullet and accept that the system currently under contract would be of no use to them. I won't go into gory details, but the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization meant that the system under contract no longer met their (A level) requirements. Obviously this was in no way the fault of the contractor--or for that matter the government. But we needed renegotiate the contract to reflect the changed requirements. The changes caused by Goldwater-Nichols were not deployed in time for the first Gulf War, but workarounds were used with Scud launch data. The changes were there for the recent fighting in Afganistan and Iraq, and were an improvement over the Gulf War situation. So Goldwater-Nichols was a significant improvement in the way large scale joint combat was run, and some of those changes had cost consequences. Fine, as long as you go in with your eyes open--and continue to compare the overall system to the overall system requirements not just the detailed requirements. -- Robert I. Eachus �In an ally, considerations of house, clan, planet, race are insignificant beside two prime questions, which are: 1. Can he shoot? 2. Will he aim at your enemy?� -- from the Laiden novels by Sharon Lee and Steve Miller.