From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on polar.synack.me X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.4 X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,CP1252 X-Google-Thread: 103376,f039470e8f537101 X-Google-Attributes: gid103376,public X-Google-ArrivalTime: 2003-07-22 14:50:11 PST Path: archiver1.google.com!news1.google.com!newsfeed.stanford.edu!cyclone.bc.net!logbridge.uoregon.edu!arclight.uoregon.edu!wn13feed!worldnet.att.net!204.127.198.203!attbi_feed3!attbi.com!rwcrnsc51.ops.asp.att.net.POSTED!not-for-mail Message-ID: <3F1DB179.4020903@attbi.com> From: "Robert I. Eachus" User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.0.2) Gecko/20021120 Netscape/7.01 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 Newsgroups: comp.lang.ada Subject: Re: Ariane5 FAQ References: <1058799152.775376@master.nyc.kbcfp.com> <20619edc.0307221036.196f2149@posting.google.com> <1058901827.202500@master.nyc.kbcfp.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit NNTP-Posting-Host: 66.31.71.243 X-Complaints-To: abuse@comcast.net X-Trace: rwcrnsc51.ops.asp.att.net 1058910610 66.31.71.243 (Tue, 22 Jul 2003 21:50:10 GMT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 21:50:10 GMT Organization: Comcast Online Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2003 21:50:10 GMT Xref: archiver1.google.com comp.lang.ada:40673 Date: 2003-07-22T21:50:10+00:00 List-Id: Hyman Rosen wrote: > Mike Silva wrote: > >> What evidence do you have that if the behavior (I refuse to call it a >> limitation) had been better documented, anybody would have noticed, >> and realized that it would be a problem for the Ariane 5? > > > The findings of the investigatory board, which say that. Where? As far as I can tell there are no FINDINGS like that. Especially in an accident investigation, finding has a limited and well defined meaning. The findings (section 3.1) related to the failure are: 13. The inertial reference system of Ariane 5 is essentially common to a system which is presently flying on Ariane 4. The part of the software which caused the interruption in the inertial system computers is used before launch to align the inertial reference system and, in Ariane 4, also to enable a rapid realignment of the system in case of a late hold in the countdown. This realignment function, which does not serve any purpose on Ariane 5, was nevertheless retained for commonality reasons and allowed, as in Ariane 4, to operate for approx. 40 seconds after lift-off. 14. During design of the software of the inertial reference system used for Ariane 4 and Ariane 5, a decision was taken that it was not necessary to protect the inertial system computer from being made inoperative by an excessive value of the variable related to the horizontal velocity, a protection which was provided for several other variables of the alignment software. When taking this design decision, it was not analysed or fully understood which values this particular variable might assume when the alignment software was allowed to operate after lift-off. 15. In Ariane 4 flights using the same type of inertial reference system there has been no such failure because the trajectory during the first 40 seconds of flight is such that the particular variable related to horizontal velocity cannot reach, with an adequate operational margin, a value beyond the limit present in the software. 16. Ariane 5 has a high initial acceleration and a trajectory which leads to a build-up of horizontal velocity which is five times more rapid than for Ariane 4. The higher horizontal velocity of Ariane 5 generated, within the 40-second timeframe, the excessive value which caused the inertial system computers to cease operation. 17. The purpose of the review process, which involves all major partners in the Ariane 5 programme, is to validate design decisions and to obtain flight qualification. In this process, the limitations of the alignment software were not fully analysed and the possible implications of allowing it to continue to function during flight were not realised. 18. The specification of the inertial reference system and the tests performed at equipment level did not specifically include the Ariane 5 trajectory data. Consequently the realignment function was not tested under simulated Ariane 5 flight conditions, and the design error was not discovered. 19. It would have been technically feasible to include almost the entire inertial reference system in the overall system simulations which were performed. For a number of reasons it was decided to use the simulated output of the inertial reference system, not the system itself or its detailed simulation. Had the system been included, the failure could have been detected. Incidently, note that in finding 17, it only speaks about Ariane 5 programme reviews, not the ones done for Ariane 4. Similarly findings 14-16 should be considered as a group, or you get the wrong impression. -- Robert I. Eachus �In an ally, considerations of house, clan, planet, race are insignificant beside two prime questions, which are: 1. Can he shoot? 2. Will he aim at your enemy?� -- from the Laiden novels by Sharon Lee and Steve Miller.