From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on polar.synack.me X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_20,INVALID_MSGID autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.4 X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit X-Google-Thread: 103376,885dab3998d28a4 X-Google-Attributes: gid103376,public From: Ken Garlington Subject: Re: Ariane 5 failure Date: 1996/10/04 Message-ID: <32555A39.E38@lmtas.lmco.com>#1/1 X-Deja-AN: 187628766 references: <96100111162774@psavax.pwfl.com> content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii organization: Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems mime-version: 1.0 newsgroups: comp.lang.ada x-mailer: Mozilla 2.02 (Macintosh; I; 68K) Date: 1996-10-04T00:00:00+00:00 List-Id: Matthew Heaney wrote: > > Buyers of mission-critical software should think very carefully before they > commit any financial resources to implementing a software system that > requires checks be turned off. I'd say take your money instead to Las > Vegas: your odds for success are better there. Better not drive or fly there: more than likely, the software systems running in your car, plane, etc. are written in a language without any built-in support for checks. Checks are not a magic wand. They do not inherently make systems safer. What matters is how you use the checks. If your ABS software fails in the middle of winter, printing out a stack dump is not going to make you much safer! -- LMTAS - "Our Brand Means Quality" For more info, see http://www.lmtas.com or http://www.lmco.com