From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on polar.synack.me X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.3 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,INVALID_MSGID autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.4 X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit X-Google-Thread: 103376,885dab3998d28a4 X-Google-Attributes: gid103376,public From: Ken Garlington Subject: Re: Ariane 5 failure Date: 1996/10/02 Message-ID: <3252B564.78A9@lmtas.lmco.com>#1/1 X-Deja-AN: 186802246 references: <96100114390546@psavax.pwfl.com> content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii organization: Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems mime-version: 1.0 newsgroups: comp.lang.ada x-mailer: Mozilla 2.02 (Macintosh; I; 68K) Date: 1996-10-02T00:00:00+00:00 List-Id: Marin David Condic, 407.796.8997, M/S 731-93 wrote: > > The real danger is a common mode failure where a design flaw > exists in the software used by both channels - they both see the > same inputs and both make the same mistake. Of course trapping > those exceptions doesn't necessarily guarantee success since > either the exception handler or the desired accommodation could > also be flawed and the flaw will, by definition, exist in both > channels. The problem also exists if you have a common-mode _hardware_ failure (e.g. a hardware design fault, or an external upset like lightning that hits both together). -- LMTAS - "Our Brand Means Quality" For more info, see http://www.lmtas.com or http://www.lmco.com