From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on polar.synack.me X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.3 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,INVALID_MSGID autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.4 X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit X-Google-Thread: 103376,fd8ff14d5ba831f9,start X-Google-Attributes: gid103376,public From: Ken Garlington Subject: Re: Reply#1 To NIST request about "high integrity" C, C++ Date: 1996/07/23 Message-ID: <31F4AB63.315D@lmtas.lmco.com>#1/1 X-Deja-AN: 170328180 references: <01I7DSIB7BI6001G94@emamv1.orl.mmc.com> content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii organization: Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems mime-version: 1.0 newsgroups: comp.lang.ada x-mailer: Mozilla 2.02 (Macintosh; I; 68K) Date: 1996-07-23T00:00:00+00:00 List-Id: Mike Berens wrote: > > NSTEWART@ccmail.dsccc.com wrote: > > If I am not mistaken the Government allegedly solved this problem > about ten years ago. > The solution was called Ada. (The "problem" being a search for tools to use in analyzing safety-critical C/C++ code) Actually, if you look at the list of features desired, Ada doesn't directly supply all of them. However, there are commercial tools that can be used to do these type of analyses on Ada code. Ada, of course, may make it easier to do the analysis, but it doesn't magically generate all the information on the NIST wish list: > dynamic memory allocation, memory paging and swapping, > recursive function calls, control flow complexity, > interface ambiguities, dynamic binding, tasking, interrupt > driven processing, built-in-functions, compiled libraries, > mixed language programming, obscure or subtle programming > constructs, dispersion of related elements, literals, > global variables, complexity of interfaces, anonymous data > types, hardware dependencies, parameter passing to > routines, data typing, class library size, operator > overloading, functions or procedures with side effects, > reserved words. -- LMTAS - "Our Brand Means Quality"